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On December 12, 2006, the United States Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) announced a major revision of its principles
governing the prosecution of corporations.  DOJ’s prior
approaches were set forth in two successive policy memoranda
by Deputy Attorneys General Eric Holder (in 1999)3 and Larry
Thompson (in 2003).4 These policy statements identified cor-
porate cooperation as a critical factor in determining whether or
not to prosecute.  Two components that weighed heavily in the
analysis of corporate cooperation were:  (1) whether or not a
company was willing to waive the attorney-client privilege;
and (2) whether the company intended to pay attorneys’ fees
for individuals.  The Thompson Memorandum suggested that a
corporation should not be given credit for cooperation if it
refused to waive its attorney-client privilege or if it advanced
legal fees to employees facing investigation, even if the corpo-
ration’s policies or charter would normally call for the advance-
ment of legal fees.5
Prosecutors used the broad language of the Thompson
Memorandum to strong-arm corporations and Boards of
Directors into waiving what many consider to be the two basic
foundations of the lawyer-client relationship.  Corporations
were left with limited choices.  They could fight the govern-
ment and run the risk of ending up like Arthur Anderson or
Enron - extinct with thousands of employees out of jobs – or
give in to the aggressive prosecutorial demands.  Facing these
options, many major corporations chose the latter.  The results
of this approach quickly became clear:  while virtually no
indictments were filed against corporations, DOJ was able to
step up its successful prosecution of executives, officers, board
members and employees - utilizing the assistance and resources
of the corporation itself.
This practice of leaning on corporations to waive priv-
ilege and cut off attorneys’ fees was roundly criticized.  The
Association of Corporate Counsel conducted a survey in 2005
after their members and their members’ clients sensed the
mounting attack on their right to counsel.6 Forty percent of in-
house and outside corporate counsel respondents reported that
they had experienced an erosion of privilege since the Enron
scandals.  
While the objections to these tactics grew throughout
2004 and 2005, the boiling point came in June 2006.  Judge
Lewis A. Kaplan of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York issued his landmark decision in
the KPMG tax prosecution declaring that DOJ’s policies violat-
ed the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of former
KPMG employees.7 Specifically, Judge Kaplan agreed with
cries of foul from former employees and partners of accounting
giant KPMG when, during the course of its tax fraud investiga-
tion into KPMG, the government arguably forced KPMG to cut
off payment of the individuals’ legal fees.  
Judge Kaplan’s opinion was applauded by defense
lawyers, corporations and their officers, directors and employ-
ees, and constitutional scholars; his decision was criticized by
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies.  Bar associations,
legal scholars and commentators, and legislators also weighed
in on this debate.  On December 12, 2006, Deputy Attorney
General Paul McNulty issued his revisions to the Thompson
Memorandum, both to respond to the cacophony of criticisms
and to revise and clarify DOJ policy.8
This article first analyzes the Holder and Thompson
Memoranda, exploring the history of DOJ’s policies regarding
corporate prosecution and its practical applications by federal
prosecutors.  Second, this piece scrutinizes the Stein case and
Judge Kaplan’s opinion declaring certain government practices
to be unconstitutional.  Third, this article discusses the several
responses to the government’s overreaching, focusing on the
proposed Senate legislation and the December 12, 2006
McNulty Memorandum.  Finally, it examines the future of cor-
porate prosecutions, and the effect - if any - of DOJ’s policy
revisions engendered by the McNulty Memorandum.  
Corporate prosecutions are nothing new to this coun-
try.  As early as 1834, courts in the United States were impos-
ing corporate criminal liability in cases involving nonfeasance
of quasi-public corporations that resulted in public nuisances.9
Later, in the early 18th century, courts held commercial corpo-
rations liable for public nuisances.10 Eventually, commercial
corporations began to be held liable for crimes that did not
require an element of criminal intent.11 Finally, by the early
1900s, corporations were being held criminally liable for
crimes of intent under agency theories.12 The 1980s witnessed
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The United States Attorney is the representa-
tive not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to gov-
ern impartially is as compelling as its obliga-
tion to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.  He may prose-
cute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he
should do so.  But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improp-
er methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.1
* * *
The imposition of economic punishment by
prosecutors before anyone has been found
guilty of anything, is not a legitimate govern-
mental interest -- it is an abuse of power.2
Introduction
Holder, Thompson, and the History of Corporate
Prosecution Guidelines
a slew of insider trading scandals13 and the 1990s saw the boil-
er room and pump-and-dump schemes that rocked the stock
markets.14
The late 1990s ushered in a new front on the Justice
Department’s war on corporate fraud—full-scale attacks on
corporate entities.  These prosecutions varied widely from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  To the general public, as well as
corporations and white collar lawyers, there was little guidance
from “Main Justice” on what was and was not fair game.  The
result was a series of policy statements issued by the
Department of Justice.
The 1999 Holder Memorandum
In 1999, as a result of the mounting criticism from
corporate entities and defense attorneys regarding the lack of
uniformity in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, DOJ
announced its first corporate charging policy.
Then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr.
issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors
entitled "Federal Prosecution of Corporations,"
more commonly known as the "Holder
Memorandum."15 The Holder Memorandum
listed factors that a prosecutor should consider
in deciding whether to charge a corporation.
The factors to be considered were: 
1. The nature and seriousness of the 
offense, including the risk of harm to 
the public, and applicable policies and
priorities, if any, governing the prose-
cution of corporations for particular 
categories of crime;
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corpo-
ration, including the complicity in, or condonation 
of, the wrongdoing by corporate management;
3. The corporation’s history of similar conduct, 
including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforce-
ment actions against it;
4. The corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure 
of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the
waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work-
product privileges;
5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation’s 
compliance program;
6. The corporation’s remedial actions, including any 
efforts to implement an effective corporate compli-
ance program or to improve an existing one, to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate 
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with 
the relevant government agencies;
7. Collateral consequences, including disproportion-
ate harm to shareholders and employees not proven 
personally culpable; and 
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as 
civil or regulatory enforcement actions.16
The Holder Memorandum stressed that "[c]orpora-
tions should not be treated leniently because of their artificial
nature nor should they be subject to harsher treatment."17 In
setting out these factors for prosecutors to consider when mak-
ing corporate charging decisions, the Holder Memorandum
clearly linked corporate cooperation to a corporation’s willing-
ness to waive its attorney-client and work product privileges.
The Holder Memorandum’s foray into providing
guidance and creating uniformity was met with mixed results.
The factors laid out in the Memorandum were merely hortato-
ry, not binding, and the Memorandum did not address how
these factors were to be weighed.  The result of this lack of
clarity was a general consensus among prosecutors that they
were being given carte blanche to request waivers, a conclusion
met by skepticism from many including corporate officials and
the white collar defense bar.18 White collar practitioners and
corporate counsel immediately recognized the threat posed by
the pressure tactics that often resulted in the waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege.  
In May 2000, for example, the Association of
Corporate Counsel ("ACC") complained to DOJ that the ACC's
"members indicate that it is the regular practice
of U.S. Attorneys to require corporations to
waive their attorney-client privileges and
divulge confidential conversations and docu-
ments in order to prove cooperation with a pros-
ecutor's investigation.”19
Between 1999 and 2003, this coun-
try experienced one of the most explosive eras
of corporate prosecutions.  Federal prosecutors
across the country investigated and prosecuted
corporations, partnerships, boards of directors,
executives and employees of some of the
world’s largest and most successful companies.
Names once known to only those in the business
community – like Enron, Tyco and Worldcom - became known
nationwide.  At the same time, there was a sharp increase in the
number of health care fraud prosecutions.  For example, after
several years and several separate investigations, Tenet
Healthcare agreed to pay the Federal Government $900 million
for billing violations20 and at least another $395 million to
patients themselves for unnecessary medical procedures.21
Similarly, in 2001, Taketa-Abbott Pharmaceutical Products Inc.
paid nearly $600 million under the False Claims Act.22 Then,
in 2003, HCA Inc. settled government investigations for a
record combined total of $1.7 billion in criminal and civil
claims for a range of conduct including cost report fraud and
payment of kickback to physicians.23
What was common to many of these prosecutions was
DOJ’s use of the Holder Memorandum to force corporate coop-
eration.  Investigators and prosecutors had little guidance out-
side of the Holder Memorandum.  The result was a hodgepodge
of approaches by prosecutors, leading to a wide array of out-
comes ranging from restitution to victims, criminal fines, civil
penalties, “corporate integrity agreements” and, in the case of
Enron, Tyco, and Worldcom, real prison time.24
The 2003 Thompson Memorandum
In January 2003, the Justice Department made a con-
certed effort to further refine and elaborate on the corporate
prosecution guidelines.  In the wake of the investigations and
prosecutions of Enron, Worldcom, Anderson Consulting, Tyco,
HealthSouth, other companies and their executives, officers 
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At its inception, the KPMG
investigation was, from the gov-
ernment’s standpoint, a relative-
ly simple one: it was about
KPMG’s use and marketing of
certain suspect tax shelter
devices . . . the KPMG case now
stands at the center of the
debate on the use and abuse of
prosecutorial powers in the war
on corporate crime.
and employees, there was a widespread consensus that the
Holder Memorandum needed amending.  Then-Deputy
Attorney General Larry D. Thompson issued his own memo-
randum entitled “Principals of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations,” better known as “The Thompson
Memorandum.”25 It changed the Holder principles in two pri-
mary ways.  First, DOJ’s guiding principles were no longer
supposed to be merely advisory; the Thompson Memorandum
made these principles binding on all federal prosecutors in
every case where a company might be criminally liable.
Second, the Thompson Memorandum elevated the importance
of corporate cooperation and corporate compliance programs.
The Thompson Memorandum emphasized that "[t]oo often
business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a
DOJ investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and
effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under
investigation."26 The Thompson Memorandum expressly stat-
ed that “the main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis
on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s coopera-
tion.”27 The Thompson Memorandum is clear in its comments: 
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the
adequacy of a corporation’s cooperation is the com-
pleteness of its disclosure including . . . a waiver of the
attorney-client and work product protections [as well
as] whether the corporation appears to be protecting 
its culpable employees and agents . . . through the 
advancing of attorney’s fees.28
These definitions of cooperation were significant
shifts in the manner in which prosecutors previously had
judged a corporation’s good faith in responding to investiga-
tions.  Never before had a prosecutor been able to take into
account a corporation’s willingness to advance or pay attor-
ney’s fees for individuals.  Indeed, to the contrary, it was the
norm for corporations to pay such fees, especially where the
corporation had entered into a contractual agreement to do so.29
Moreover, this policy shift seemed to turn the “innocent until
proven guilty” maxim on its head.  The presumption now
seemed to be that individuals, whether they be mere witnesses,
subjects or even targets, should not get the benefit of corporate
assistance in paying legal fees.  These restrictions were not
linked to guilt or innocence; rather, they attached at the
moment the prosecutors took an interest in the individual.
One thing was certain:  the Thompson Memorandum’s
goal was not a subtle one.  In the rubble of the corporate fraud
investigations and prosecutions of the prior four years, the
Memorandum was seen as a tool to allow prosecutors to force
companies to cooperate fully with DOJ investigators, to root
out the wrongdoing of individuals, and to implement compre-
hensive (and expensive) compliance programs.  For corpora-
tions, the possibility that the government would agree not to
prosecute (or to defer prosecution for a specified time period,
after which charges would be dismissed) was the only potential
upside. 
Corporate America and the white collar bar did not
take these changes lightly.30 In the stroke of a pen, DOJ had
redefined the ways corporations under law enforcement scruti-
ny would do business.  Expensive, detailed, and labor intensive
compliance programs were now practically required.
Moreover, a corporation now had additional tangible bench-
marks by which their “cooperation” would be judged:  (1) Did
the corporation waive privilege?; and (2) Did the corporation
pay for the attorneys’ fees of former and current executive offi-
cers and employees? The chorus of criticism was not limited to
the corporate boardroom (and their counsel).  For example, a
coalition of former DOJ officials, including three former
Attorneys General and three former Deputy Attorneys General,
sharply criticized the waiver policy.31
Understandably, critics focused their attacks on the
Memorandum’s directives regarding corporate cooperation and
its necessity towards avoiding prosecution.  The Thompson
Memorandum highlighted powerful tools for prosecutors and,
importantly, encouraged their use:  (a) the forced waivers of the
attorney-client privilege; and (b) the refusal to pay for individ-
uals’ attorneys’ fees.  Coupled with the pressures on corpora-
tions not to enter into joint defense arrangements with alleged
individual wrongdoers and to make documents and witnesses
readily available, the Thompson Memorandum gave prosecu-
tors a virtually unfettered ability to mandate full cooperation.
The United States Sentencing Guidelines
The powerful tools prosecutors had to insist upon
cooperation did not end with the Thompson Memorandum.
The United States Sentencing Commission also provided fed-
eral prosecutors with yet another means to enforce this cooper-
ation.  In May 2004, the United States Sentencing Commission
followed suit with the Thompson Memorandum and approved
amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  The
Guidelines Amendments provided that “the two factors that
mitigate the ultimate punishment of an organization are (i) the
existence of an effective compliance and ethics program; and
(ii) self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibili-
ty.”32 According to the 2004 Amendments, waiver of attorney-
client privilege and of work product protections “is not a pre-
requisite to a reduction in culpability score . . . unless such a
waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and thorough
disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organiza-
tion.”33 Criticisms of these Guidelines changes paralleled
those levied against the Thompson Memorandum.34
It did not take long for a single case to highlight the
Thompson Memorandum’s coercive and potentially unconsti-
tutional power when in the hands of certain prosecutors.  The
fight over the extent to which federal prosecutors could lean on
corporations, demand cooperation, insist on privilege waivers,
and interfere with traditional fee arrangements reached its
zenith in the tax and fraud investigation of KPMG and the ulti-
mate prosecution of a number of its executives and employees.
This matter shined a searing spotlight on the aggressive tactics
used by prosecutors in the wave of corporate fraud prosecu-
tions and on the constitutional and ethical infirmities in those
approaches.  Examining and analyzing the KPMG case is
instructive.
United States v. Stein35 is one of the largest, most well-
known and controversial criminal tax cases in our nation’s his-
tory.  What began as a somewhat routine Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) investigation of KPMG in 2003 morphed into
one of the most constitutionally intriguing criminal law deci-
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The KPMG Case
sions of the past half-century.  The practical consequences of
the Stein decision on corporate prosecutions will be felt for
years to come.  
At its inception the KPMG investigation was, from
the government’s standpoint, a relatively simple one:  it was
about KPMG’s use and marketing of certain suspect tax shelter
devices.  Since then, it has come to stand for much more.  Due
to certain aggressive actions taken by DOJ, the KPMG case
now stands at the center of the debate on the use and abuse of
prosecutorial powers in the war on corporate crime.  Dissecting
this KPMG case and Judge Kaplan’s landmark opinion is
essential for understanding the future of corporate prosecu-
tions.
The Stein case began as an IRS investigation into
KPMG, its leadership and the use of certain tax shelter
devices.36 As a result of the IRS investigation, Jeffery Stein,
the former KPMG deputy chairman, and several other senior
partners were asked to resign their positions at the firm.37 In
Mr. Stein’s case, his severance package included an agreement
that “Mr. Stein would be represented at KPMG’s expense, in
any suits brought against KPMG or its personnel and himself,
by counsel acceptable to both him and the firm.”38
The Government’s Efforts to Enforce Cooperation
On February 5, 2004, the IRS made a criminal refer-
ral to DOJ, specifically the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Southern District of New York.39 Shortly thereafter, the gov-
ernment notified over thirty KPMG employees and partners
that they were “subjects” of the federal grand jury investigation
of the suspect tax shelters.40 Around the same time, KPMG ter-
minated several partners in an effort to potentially stave off cor-
porate prosecution.  
This decision came on the heels of the tough question-
ing of several partners during their testimony before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.  Over two
days, the subcommittee hearings focused on “the role of pro-
fessional organizations like accounting firms, law firms, and
financial institutions in developing, marketing, and implement-
ing tax shelters.”41 Six partners and executives from KPMG, as
well as representatives from other accounting firms, law firms,
and a panel of government regulators testified before the
Senate Subcommittee.42 As Judge Kaplan noted, the “firm’s
reception at the hearing was not favorable.”43
The Assistant U.S. Attorneys (“AUSAs”) handling the
case wasted no time in putting pressure on KPMG to fully
cooperate with the criminal probe.  On February 25, 2004, the
AUSAs met with KPMG’s attorneys.44 During this meeting the
AUSAs put intense pressure on KPMG to refuse to pay or
advance attorneys’ fees to those employees who refused to
cooperate, who invoked Fifth Amendment rights or who were
indicted.45 The prosecutors repeatedly invoked the Thompson
Memorandum (and the Sentencing Guidelines) in their efforts
to strong-arm KPMG.46
Understandably, KPMG found itself in a nearly
impossible position.  The importance of the firm (as opposed to
the individual partners) avoiding indictment cannot be over-
stated.  It was not too long ago that the “Big Four” accounting
firms were the “Big Five.”  This was before Arthur Andersen
was prosecuted and convicted for obstruction of justice relating
to the Enron scandal.47 Arthur Andersen LLP was a giant
accounting firm who provided internal audit and consulting
services to Enron.  The firm was investigated in connection
with the Enron scandal and eventually indicted with one count
of obstructing an official proceeding of the S.E.C.48 After a
fight over jury instructions regarding the level of culpability
required for a guilty verdict, the jury eventually deadlocked.49
After the judge recited the Allen charge,50 the jury deliberated
for three more days and returned a guilty verdict.  The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the jury did
not need to find any consciousness of wrongdoing and that no
reversible error had occurred.  The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and reversed, holding that the jury instructions were
infirm for several reasons.51 Although the conviction was
eventually overturned, this relief came too late to save the firm
and the jobs of thousands of Arthur Andersen employees.52
There is little doubt that KPMG weighed the demise
of Arthur Andersen when making its decision to cooperate with
the government in an attempt to avoid indictment.  In fact, one
of the amicus briefs filed in the Stein litigation highlights this
reality: “In the 212-year history of the U.S. financial markets,
no major financial-services firm has ever survived a criminal
indictment.”53 KPMG, eager to avoid this corporate death
penalty, initially attempted to continue its longstanding practice
of advancing payment to partners to defend against allegations
of violations committed in the performance of their duties and
obligations at KPMG.54 But federal prosecutors doggedly
hounded KPMG on the issue, making what KPMG regarded as
implicit threats that any payment of attorneys’ fees would be
viewed negatively.
Faced with this “proverbial gun to the head,”55 KPMG
changed its longstanding policy and notified its former partners
and employees (as well as the government) that it would not
pay attorneys’ fees if they did not cooperate.  Moreover, KPMG
imposed a $400,000 cap on all fees for any single individual
and announced that it would cease paying all fees if the indi-
vidual was indicted.56 KPMG went even further: acting in
accordance with a government request, KPMG notified its
employees that they could proceed without counsel, notwith-
standing the incredibly high stakes.57
KPMG, during the government’s investigation, con-
tinued to pressure the individual partners and employees.
When KPMG learned - almost always from the government -
that an individual subject had not fully cooperated, had refused
to be interviewed by the government, or had withheld docu-
ments, KPMG promptly informed the individual that he had ten
days to fully cooperate or else KPMG would immediately cut
off the legal fees.58
These individuals suffered oppressive consequences.
They were faced with a difficult choice:  either submit to a gov-
ernment interview and potentially make incriminating state-
ments or remain silent and potentially lose the ability to retain,
and afford, their attorney of choice.
The Consequences of KPMG Cooperation
KPMG’s decision to fully cooperate with DOJ ulti-
mately paid off, at least from the perspective of the corporate
entity and some of its workforce.  In August 2005, the U.S.
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Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
reached a settlement agreement known as a “deferred prosecu-
tion” with KPMG.  Among other things, KPMG agreed to pay
the government approximately $45 million and to open its
books and operations to independent scrutiny.  In exchange for
compliance with the stated obligations, the government agreed
to seek dismissal of criminal charges.  This extraordinary coop-
eration with the government helped KPMG avoid the ruinous
indictment it feared.  
The individual partners and employees did not fare as
well.  In August 2005, six former partners and the former
deputy chairman were indicted for criminal tax fraud conspira-
cy.  Two months later, in October, another ten individuals were
indicted on criminal conspiracy and tax evasion.59 If convict-
ed, these individuals faced up to five years in prison on the con-
spiracy charges and five years on the tax evasion charge.60
Despite having their fees completely cut off, the indi-
vidual defendants did not rollover.  In some cases, they kept the
same counsel; in other cases, they retained new counsel, some-
times more affordable.  These defendants felt stung not only by
KPMG’s decision to cut off fees, but also by the government’s
significant role in KPMG’s decision, a fact that perhaps
weighed more heavily than KPMG’s somewhat justified deci-
sion.  Indeed, the defendants strongly believed that the govern-
ment had forced KPMG to act as it did.61
The defendants challenged what they perceived to be
unconstitutional coercion by the prosecutors.  Specifically, the
defendants moved to dismiss the indictment (or for other relief)
on the ground that the government had interfered improperly
with the advancement of attorneys’ fees by KPMG in violation
of their constitutional rights.62 The defendants alleged, among
other things, that the prosecution’s wrongful interference with
advancement of defendants’ legal fees violated their constitu-
tional rights to counsel and a fair trial.63 They maintained that
the government had “substantially interfer[ed]” with KPMG
and its partners’ freedom to contract and had induced KPMG to
stop advancing their costs of defense.64 The defendants further
asserted that the government had “tortuously interfered with
the business relationship between KPMG and its employee-
partners” and infringed on the defendants’ constitutional rights
to counsel and a fair trial.65
Judge Kaplan’s Decision
Judge Kaplan agreed with the defendants.  Judge
Kaplan took the government to the woodshed for its role in
KPMG’s decision to cut off the defendants’ attorneys’ fees,
sharply criticizing DOJ policy as well as the specific actions of
prosecutors in this case.  Judge Kaplan, widely regarded as a
middle-of-the-road jurist, not siding with any unusual frequen-
cy either the government or defendants, blistered the govern-
ment for its conduct.  In a sharply worded eighty-three-page
opinion, Judge Kaplan concluded that the Department of
Justice had violated the former KPMG partners’ and employ-
ees’ substantive due process rights and their rights to counsel
and a fair trial.66 As detailed below, his comprehensive and
landmark opinion held that DOJ’s application of the Thompson
Memorandum in the KPMG investigation violated the Fifth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the former partners
and employees.67 Specifically, the court found that the imple-
mentation of the Thompson Memorandum had violated the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because it denied the
defendants the fundamental right to defend themselves with
legally available resources, without DOJ interference.68 Judge
Kaplan also held that the government’s actions violated the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, in that the AUSAs inter-
fered with the defendants’ right to representation by counsel of
their choice.69
Substantive Due Process
With regard to the substantive due process claim,
Judge Kaplan concluded that the government overstepped per-
missive prosecutorial limits when it intensely pressured KPMG
to withhold legal fees.  Judge Kaplan reasoned that the numer-
ous and calculated references to the Thompson Memorandum
(and Sentencing Guidelines) coupled with the powerful impact
of the Memorandum itself, violated the defendants’ substantive
due process right to fundamental fairness in criminal proceed-
ings. Judge Kaplan found that the prosecutor’s conduct violat-
ed the defendants’ constitutional ‘‘right to obtain and use in
order to prepare a defense resources lawfully available to him
or her, free of knowing or reckless government interference.’’70
Judge Kaplan examined the constitutional implica-
tions of the government’s actions in light of the practical reali-
ties of complex, high-stakes criminal investigations and prose-
cutions.  His opinion expressly recognized that complex white
collar cases invariably mean gigantic legal fees, due to massive
document productions and reviews, extensive pretrial maneu-
vering and briefing, the frequent use of expert financial,
accounting and tax experts, and the multi-month length of
many trials.71 In turn, Judge Kaplan reasoned that the govern-
ment directly interfered with the defendants’ ability to mount a
defense because the government had, for all intents and purpos-
es, precluded the defendants from receiving money to pay their
legal bills.72
Judge Kaplan utilized traditional due process analysis
in reaching this conclusion.  Specifically, he applied strict
scrutiny to the government’s actions.  In doing so, he conclud-
ed that the government did not have any legitimate interest in
precluding the payment of legal fees and in treating such pay-
ments as shielding and protecting culpable individuals.73
Judge Kaplan stated, “[t]he imposition of economic punish-
ment by prosecutors, before anyone had been found guilty of
anything, is not a legitimate governmental interest – it is an
abuse of power.”74 Judge Kaplan did not undermine the gov-
ernment’s legitimate interest in evaluating corporate coopera-
tion while making charging decisions.  Rather, he found that
the Thompson Memorandum and the prosecutor’s use of it
were not narrowly tailored to serve this interest.  He concluded
that the Thompson Memorandum did not sufficiently address
the governmental concern, including the payment of fees as a
means to impede, obstruct or interfere with an ongoing investi-
gation or prosecution.  Judge Kaplan expressly noted, “[t]here
is no necessary inconsistency between an entity cooperating
with the government and, at the same time, paying defense
costs of individual employees and former employees.”75
Continuing, Judge Kaplan stated that “the Thompson
Memorandum does not say that payment of legal fees may cut
in favor of indictment only if it is used as a means to obstruct
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an investigation.”76 Thus, the Memorandum and its procedures
were not, in Judge Kaplan’s view, narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling and legitimate objective.  Instead, it “discourages
and, as a practical matter, often prevents companies from pro-
viding employees and former employees with the financial
means to exercise their constitutional rights to defend them-
selves.”77
Right to Counsel
Judge Kaplan’s decision does not rest solely on due
process grounds.  He also concluded that the government’s con-
duct violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  As a pre-
liminary matter, Judge Kaplan addressed the well-established
principle that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
attach until after a defendant is indicted.  Judge Kaplan rejected
the notion that pre-indictment events cannot serve as the basis
for a constitutional violation, concluding ‘‘[t]he fact that events
were set in motion prior to indictment with the object of having,
or with knowledge that they were likely to have, an unconstitu-
tional effect upon indictment cannot save the government. This
conduct, unless justified, violates the Sixth Amendment.”78 He
emphasized that ‘‘[t]he government here acted with the purpose
of minimizing these defendants’ access to resources necessary
to mount their defenses or, at least, in reckless disregard that
this would be the likely result of its actions.”79
The government also argued that interference with
obtaining third-party payment for attorneys’ fees does not con-
stitute a Sixth Amendment violation.  Judge Kaplan brushed
this argument aside.  He found that the individual defendants
had a legitimate expectation that KPMG would continue its
longstanding policy of paying attorneys’ fees.  He found this
expectation rooted in both tort and contract law, concluding that
‘‘[t]he right [of an employee to have an employer pay legal
expenses] is as much a part of the bargain between employer
and employee as salary or wages.”80
Throughout his opinion, Judge Kaplan stressed the
harmful effects that the Thompson Memorandum, and the gov-
ernment’s abuse of it, had on the adversarial process in general.
Judge Kaplan viewed these efforts not as fair blows, as demand-
ed by Berger, but as prejudicial interference with the system’s
fair workings.81 He concluded that the Thompson
Memorandum “undermines the proper functioning of the adver-
sary process that the Constitution adopted as the mode of deter-
mining guilt or innocence in criminal cases,” and that “[t]he
actions of prosecutors who implement it can make matters even
worse, as occurred here.”82
Needless to say, the government disagreed with Judge
Kaplan’s analysis and conclusions.  On July 27, 2006, Michael
Garcia, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, issued a statement defending the line prosecutors’ actions.
He stated, “The actions of the government were entirely consis-
tent with appropriate Department of Justice policy, and we
believe that the prosecutors acted ethically and properly
throughout the case.”83
While Judge Kaplan’s constitutional analysis was both
novel and interesting, the practical effect of his decision - both
in the Stein case and in future cases - is less certain.  The indi-
vidual defendants in Stein sought the complete dismissal of the
indictment as well as the suppression of certain pre-indictment
statements, allegedly made in part because of fee-related pres-
sures.  The defendants also sought monetary sanctions against
the prosecutors.  Judge Kaplan denied the motion to dismiss the
indictment and rejected the defendants’ efforts to obtain finan-
cial sanctions against the prosecutors.  Instead, Judge Kaplan
elected to provide the defendants with an opportunity to obtain
funds for their defense.  He initiated ancillary proceedings in
the criminal case aimed at making a determination regarding the
defendants’ claims against KPMG for fees.
Since this landmark opinion, the trial has been contin-
ued to ensure that the defendants have a fair opportunity to pre-
pare for trial “notwithstanding the government’s improper inter-
ference with the payment of legal fees and failure to comply
with the discovery deadline.”84 Based on Judge Kaplan’s find-
ings, the KPMG defendants have sued KPMG for attorneys fees
in the Southern District of New York.85 The defendants allege
that KPMG would have advanced the attorneys’ fees “but for
the unconstitutional interference with KPMG’s practice and
policy of advancing such expenses” by the U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District.86 KPMG has fought back, refusing to pay the
fees notwithstanding Judge Kaplan’s opinion,  The civil suit
could take months, even years to come to a resolution and Judge
Kaplan has made it clear that the criminal case will not proceed
until the issue of the attorneys’ fees is settled.  Recently, Judge
Kaplan granted a second continuance, this time postponing the
trial indefinitely.87
On January 3, 2007, United States District Court Judge
Loretta A. Preska dismissed the criminal/conspiracy charge
against KPMG, concurring with federal prosecutors who con-
cluded that KPMG had fully complied with the 2005 deferred
prosecution agreement that allowed KPMG to avoid a fate sim-
ilar to that met by Arthur Andersen three years earlier.  While
KPMG must still submit to special oversight until at least
September 2008,88 this development allowed KPMG to focus
on the future and put the past behind it.
While KPMG executives and leaders applauded the
decision and vowed model compliance and ethics programs,
former KPMG executives - still fighting the criminal case -
strongly objected.  These individuals’ lawyers say that they fol-
lowed laws then on the books and asserted that they were the
victims of intense government pressure, an argument that Judge
Kaplan has supported.89
Legislative Response to the KPMG Case
Senator Arlen Specter, the then lame-duck Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee,90 responded relatively swiftly to
the growing clamor regarding abusive practices in corporate
prosecutions.  On December 7, 2006, he proposed legislation  -
- the Attorney-Client Protection Act of 2006 (“ACPPA”) -- that
set its sights not only on the abusive prosecutorial practices but
also on the Thompson Memorandum itself.91 The ACPPA pro-
posed that federal prosecutors be prohibited from using a com-
pany’s waiver of attorney-client privilege, as well as other fac-
tors, to determine the company’s level of cooperation.  Section
3014 (b) stated: 
In any Federal investigation or criminal or civil 
enforcement matter, an agent or attorney of the United 
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States shall not - (1) demand, request, or condition 
treatment on the disclosure by an organization, or per-
son affiliated with that organization, of any communi-
cation protected by the attorney-client privilege or any
attorney work product; (2) condition a civil or criminal
charging decision relating to a organization, or person
affiliated with that organization, on, or use as a factor
in determining whether an organization, or person 
affiliated with that organization, is cooperating with 
the Government. - (A) any valid assertion of the attor-
ney-client privilege or privilege for attorney work 
product; (B) the provision of counsel to, or contribu-
tion to the legal defense fees or expenses of, an 
employee of that organization…92
Further, in an obvious attempt to force DOJ to revise
its corporate charging policies as outlined in the Thompson
Memorandum, Senator Specter noted, “Cases should be prose-
cuted on their merits, not based on how well an organization
works with the prosecutor.”93 Most notably, the ACPPA sought
lasting and deep protections of the attorney-client privilege,
even those stretching beyond the corporation context.
Specifically, the ACPPA sought to protect "any communica-
tion"94 covered by the attorney-client privilege and not just
those of a corporation.  Similarly, and again in direct response
to the constitutional issues raised in Stein, the ACPPA also
extended to prohibiting consideration of a company's decision
to: (a) pay the attorneys fees of an employee under investiga-
tion; (b) enter into a joint defense agreement with employees;
and (c) refuse to terminate a person's employment if the
employee does not cooperate in an investigation.95 Notably,
this approach would have extended to so-called parallel pro-
ceedings and civil enforcement actions by agencies including
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Office of
Inspector General and the Federal Election Commission. 
The ACPPA arguably raised more questions than it
answered.  The legislation failed to set forth the standards gov-
erning inquiries regarding the government’s conduct.
Fundamental legal and procedural questions seem to have been
left wide open:  Who bears the burden of proof on any hearing?
Will there be a full mini-trial on these issues? Will the rules of
evidence apply?  What will the standard of review be at the
appellate levels?  Who has standing to allege a violation of the
statute - the corporation, the individual, a shareholder?  If a
challenge is brought pre-indictment, how is Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6, governing grand jury secrecy, implicat-
ed? Will matters be addressed under seal?  
Additionally, the statute failed to provide any guidance
on the appropriate remedy if and when a violation occurs.  More
questions remained:  Will the indictment be dismissed?  Can a
court step in and halt an investigation?  Will the court appoint a
special prosecutor or a monitor to oversee the investigation?
Certainly such intervention will give rise to separation of power
issues.  Moreover, it is well established that courts are general-
ly loath to interfere with matters traditionally within the reason-
able range of prosecutorial discretion.  The Supreme Court has
placed significant restrictions on the supervisory power of the
courts to attempt to remedy prosecutorial misconduct by dis-
missing indictments, and it is virtually unheard of for a court to
interfere with an ongoing grand jury investigation.96
McNulty Memorandum
It came as no surprise to anyone following the issue
that DOJ did not just sit back and let the Senate resolve these
sticky constitutional, prosecutorial and ethical issues affecting
the day-to-day dealings of thousands of prosecutors.  On
December 12, 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty
formally announced a revision of DOJ policy regarding the fed-
eral prosecution of business organizations.  Just as Larry
Thompson expressly superseded Eric Holder’s once-controlling
Memorandum in an effort to revise and clarify certain guide-
lines regarding corporate prosecutions, Deputy Attorney
General McNulty did the same with the Thompson
Memorandum.97
Predictably, in large part in response to the furor creat-
ed by the aggressive approaches of prosecutors in a string of
cases and the stinging rebuke of Judge Kaplan in Stein, the
"McNulty Memorandum" attempted to take action in two prin-
ciple areas: (1) requests for waiver of attorney-client privilege
and work product protections from companies seeking leniency
from the government; and (2) the advancement of fees to com-
pany employees in criminal investigations and prosecutions.98
Attorney-Client Privilege Issues After McNulty
The McNulty Memorandum is in many ways a retreat
from previous DOJ policy with regards to attorney-client privi-
lege issues.  As a preliminary matter, the McNulty
Memorandum lays out the same set of relevant charging factors
previously identified in the Thompson Memorandum.  After
setting forth these criteria, the McNulty revisions—at least on
their face—limit the authority of prosecutors in the privilege
waiver and attorneys’ fees areas.  Under the McNulty
Memorandum, "[w]aiver of attorney-client and work product
protections is not a prerequisite to a finding that a company has
cooperated in the government's investigation.”99 Indeed, even
requests for waiver are now only authorized if "there is a legit-
imate need for the privileged information" in order for the gov-
ernment to fulfill its law enforcement obligations.100 Such need
may be demonstrated by the following factors: 
(a) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged 
information will benefit the government's investiga-
tion;
(b) whether the information sought can be obtained in
a timely and complete fashion by using alternative 
means that do not require waiver;
(c) the completeness of the voluntary disclosure 
already provided; and
(d) the collateral consequences to a corporation of a 
waiver.101
These factors, however, are not defined in the
McNulty Memorandum.  Furthermore, even in situations where
prosecutors determine that the application of the factors estab-
lishes an acceptable need for waiver, prosecutors still have an
additional hurdle - compliance with strict consultation and  
approval requirements that did not exist under the Holder or
Thompson frameworks.  
The McNulty Memorandum identifies two broad cate-
gories of information likely to be sought by prosecutors:  (1)
Category I information which is purely factual and which 
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may or may not be privileged but which is related to the under-
lying misconduct; and (2) Category II information consisting of
attorney-client communications or non-factual attorney work
product, including legal advice given to the corporation.102
Before requesting a waiver of even Category I information priv-
ilege, line prosecutors must obtain the written approval of a
United States Attorney, who in turn must furnish a copy to and
consult with the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division.  Significantly, however, a company's response to the
government's request for a waiver of privilege for Category I
information "may be considered in determining whether a cor-
poration has cooperated in the government's investigation."103
Typical items falling within Category I would be memoranda of
factual interviews with witnesses in an internal investigation.
Even more restricted, a request for Category II infor-
mation must be approved in writing by the Deputy Attorney
General, and may only be sought in "rare circumstances."104 A
company's compliance with a Category II request may be favor-
ably considered in determining whether the company has coop-
erated with the government's investigation; prosecutors, howev-
er, are explicitly prohibited from considering a refusal to com-
ply with a Category II request in their “cooperation” calcu-
lus.105
Legal Fee Issues After McNulty
With respect to fees, the McNulty Memorandum states
that "[p]rosecutors generally should not take into account
whether a corporation is advancing attorneys' fees to employees
or agents under investigation and indictment."106 However, in
a footnote, the McNulty Memorandum states that in "extreme-
ly rare cases" the advancement of attorneys' fees "may be taken
into account when the totality of the circumstances show that it
was intended to impede a criminal investigation."107 Any
request to consider such a circumstance in a charging decision
must be approved by the Deputy Attorney General.  
It took the legal community four years to understand
the true import of the Holder Memorandum and an additional
four years to comprehend the ways in which the application of
the Thompson Memorandum affected corporate prosecutions.
Accordingly, it will likely be some time before the full practical
impact of the McNulty Memorandum is understood.  In the end,
the eventual impact of the McNulty Memorandum is likely to
depend more on DOJ’s incorporation of the Memorandum into
their efforts to combat corporate fraud than the actual words on
the page.
In some ways, the McNulty Memorandum takes away
with one hand what it gave with the other. The policy was
enacted ostensibly to reduce the pressure on companies to
refuse to pay fees and to waive privilege in order to be consid-
ered to have fully cooperated with an ongoing investigation.
The new Memorandum recognizes the importance of giving
companies certain latitude on the fees issue and on the vitality
of the attorney-client protections.  Yet despite the mollifying
language of the McNulty Memorandum, DOJ has explicitly
retained the ability to punish corporations that refuse to waive
privilege and continues to permit prosecutors to take into
account the advancement of attorneys’ fees in "rare circum-
stances" - a term undefined in the Memorandum and therefore
left open to interpretation by DOJ prosecutors.  
To reach some useful conclusions about the effects of
this Memorandum and the future of corporate prosecutions, it is
helpful to examine the consequences from the vantage point of
the three truly interested parties:  (1) the prosecutors; (2) the
corporation; and (3) employees and officers.  First, the
McNulty Memorandum aims to give prosecutors even more
guidance on the proper (and constitutional) handling of corpo-
rate fraud investigations and charging decisions.  The clarifica-
tions set forth in McNulty will most likely curb egregious abus-
es by overly aggressive prosecutors.  Prosecutors will not seek
attorney-client privilege waivers as a default in every case and
instead will seek to comply more rigorously with the McNulty
guidelines.  Similarly, prosecutors will be somewhat more
restrained in exerting pressure on the attorneys’ fees issue.  That
being said, the McNulty Memorandum certainly will not elimi-
nate the use of the pressure tactics excoriated by Judge Kaplan
in Stein.  Charging decisions will remain almost exclusively in
the domain of DOJ, with virtually no legislative or judicial
oversight.  Prosecutors will continue to pressure corporations to
fully cooperate.  Occasionally, that will mean the waiver of cer-
tain privileges and the refusal to pay an employee’s attorneys’
fees.  What we may see is the more subtle use of pressure by
prosecutors.  Rather than following in the footsteps of the
KPMG prosecutors and making overt statements, prosecutors
may take greater steps to cloak their efforts at forcing coopera-
tion.
Second, examining the policy change from the vantage
point of the corporation leads to a similar conclusion:  corporate
behavior most likely will not change and corporations will be
faced with the same pressure from prosecutions.  Corporations
(acting through leadership decisions) are no less likely to
engage in fraudulent and criminal conduct.  Such conduct,
when it does take place, is driven by economic, financial and
marketplace-motivated considerations; rarely is the threat of
prosecution (or the use of certain investigative prosecutorial
tools) a determinative factor.  That being said, to the extent cor-
porate officers and executives do take into consideration poten-
tial law enforcement action, the continued possibility that pros-
ecutors will bear down on a corporation, request a privilege
waiver and demand the cutting off of attorneys’ fees, even if
somewhat more remote than prior to December 2006, may still
be enough to strike fear in their hearts and affect conduct.  
Of course, perhaps the group most affected by the
revised policy will be the corporation’s white collar criminal
defense lawyers.  These attorneys will have a new revitalized
spring in their steps when dealing with investigations of corpor-
ate clients.  The psychological impact of the developments over
the past year and the resulting DOJ policy change will be sig-
nificant.  Undoubtedly, defense attorneys will push back harder
when their corporate client is threatened - explicitly or implic-
itly - by prosecutors.  They will challenge most requests to
waive the attorney-client or work product privileges and will
balk at efforts to chill the payment of attorneys’ fees.
Emboldened by the Stein decision, the legislative response and
the McNulty Memorandum, these defense attorneys will also-
more aggressively “appeal” the actions and decisions of line
prosecutors to supervisors, U.S. Attorneys and Main Justice.
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Third, the McNulty Memorandum will affect corpo-
rate officers and employees for better and for worse.  On one
hand, officers, executives and employees of corporations stand
to benefit from these changes.  As noted above, prosecutors will
be more reluctant to lean on corporations to cut off fees; at the
same time, corporations and white collar defense attorneys will
push back harder on any suggestion to that effect.  The net result
will be that individual officers will be more likely to receive the
paid counsel of their choice, to the extent authorized by their
indemnification and other contractual agreements.  On the other
hand, the McNulty Memorandum further entrenches DOJ’s
practice of refraining from charging corporations and instead
focusing on the culpable individuals.  As has been the case since
Andersen, corporations most likely will still receive offers to
enter into deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments.  Indeed, since the issuance of the Thompson
Memorandum, DOJ has entered into at least thirty deferred and
non-prosecution agreements, as compared to one-third that
number in the previous decade. Corporations will continue to
cooperate, in one form or another, meaning individuals will
continue to be charged for alleged criminal activity.  
All of this leads to the ultimate question: how will the
public be affected by these developments?  Corporate crime has
been around for hundreds of years.  It is reasonable to conclude
that it will continue and that prosecutors will have an array of
tools to fight corporate fraud.  The McNulty Memorandum will
not significantly restrict the ability of prosecutors to identify
wrongdoing and address it either at the company or individual
level.  Prosecutors can still demand cooperation and retain the
option of charging the corporation where justified.  In this way,
shareholders, investors and the financial markets will be pro-
tected.
Perhaps of equal importance, however, there is the real
potential that justice will be better served.  Following these
developments, prosecutors now have available clearer guide-
lines to assist them in distinguishing between “fair” blows and
“foul” blows, to borrow from the Berger parlance.  Properly,
subjects and targets of white collar crime investigations will
have their constitutional due process and right to counsel pro-
tected.  Ultimately, the adversarial process, upon which our
entire system is premised, hopefully will function more effec-
tively and efficiently.
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